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Summary
The southern Japanese island of Okinawa is host to a signiﬁcant number of US bases. 
These continue to affect the local population, and have led to the establishment of a 
popular anti-base and anti-militarist peace movement on the island. In this article, I 
examine this movement’s effective use of civic activism and locate this action within 
the Japanese democratic context. Though it has not achieved the return of the bases, the 
Okinawan peace movement has generated enough scrutiny of the Japanese government 
to challenge the legitimacy of its security policies from the perspective of social and 
democratic justice. In generating the public expression of principled values about human 
security and democracy, I contend that the movement establishes an important connection 
between peace and democracy. Overall, I argue that the movement’s principled action on 
behalf of local demilitarization and democratization successfully applies radical principles 
of participatory democracy anchored in solidarist values of engagement to broader issues 
of peace. 
Introduction
A multifaceted protest movement has emerged in Okinawa, a collection of islands to the 
south of Japan, over the several decades spanning the post-War US occupation of Japan 
to the present. Several studies of Okinawa have already been dedicated to the description 
and analysis of this movement, its victories and setbacks.2 Okinawans’ preoccupation with 
war, militarism and peace stems from a compounded historical experience of political and 
cultural marginalization, and victimization by war. Not only Okinawan activists but many 
Okinawan locals have taken a stand against both militarism and war in Okinawa, even in 
the absence of armed conﬂict. This is due, on the one hand, to the violence generated by 
the bases and their impact on the population, as the bases are a constant reminder of war 
and militarism in Okinawa. In addition, rather like in Hiroshima, Okinawans’ traumatic 
experience of armed conﬂict during the Battle of Okinawa at the end of the Second World 
War legitimizes their stand against war, unifying the movement, and strengthening the 
support of the locals. Clearly, the direct collective historical experience of war, and decades 
of a highly militarized environment, add legitimacy to the peace movement. Finally, a 
speciﬁc Okinawan cultural and political identity has emerged through a rich layering of 
narratives about Okinawa’s indigenous identity distinct from Japan. These layers have 
1 I would like to thank the Japan Foundation for a grant to conduct research in Okinawa in January and 
February, 2007, as well as the Peace Research Institute of the International Christian University in Tokyo 
for its support for this ongoing project.
2See for example Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military, Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, Hein 
and Selden, eds., Islands of Discontent, and Hook and Siddle, eds., Japan and Okinawa. 
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contributed to the development of a spirit of resistance focused on demilitarization and 
peace, encapsulated in the term “Okinawa struggle” (Okinawa no tatakai).3 The question 
of Okinawa’s elusively coherent identity has been a signiﬁcant source of scholarly 
preoccupation in the analysis of Okinawa’s peace movement. Addressing the “Okinawa 
struggle” and its effectiveness in constraining state policy with regard to the bases in 
their territory, Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle make their central question whether 
Okinawa may or may not be considered “Japan,”4 and in what ways this distinctiveness 
strengthens the movement. Miyume Tanji, for her part, analyses the relationship between 
the diversity of voices and protest groups in Okinawa, concluding that a unique identity or 
even “myth” about Okinawan resistance has given the movement its force and power.5 
In this article, I do not focus on the intricacies of Okinawan identity with respect 
to Japan. Instead I test the hypothesis that peace activism and democratic activism are 
mutually reinforcing forms of principled action. I examine some of the ideational features 
structuring the movement, and the resources it has used to confront and challenge the 
Japanese government’s security policies in Okinawa. On the basis of documented events 
and outcomes of the movement’s activities, I consider how the movement has successfully 
constrained governmental policies, as well as raised awareness about the ongoing injustice 
to Okinawans perpetrated by the presence of the bases. Peace activism has historically 
been shaped by varied ethical and ideational contexts, and anti-war movements have 
consistently relied on a set of ethical principles to achieve their purposes.6 The appropriation 
of democratic principles, especially the principles of participatory citizenship, and the 
critique of Japanese nationalism, are an important but overlooked dimension of the strength 
of the Okinawan protest movement as a peace movement. In particular, I highlight the 
critical function of the Okinawan peace movement and its success in drawing attention to 
the limitations of Japanese democracy, including the challenge to the connection between 
nationalism and security, and between nationalism and citizenship. The Okinawan 
peace movement’s success, at least in terms of its longevity, I argue, contributes to our 
understanding of contemporary secular peace movements precisely by demonstrating the 
close connections between democracy and peace. 
For the purpose of this study, I deﬁne anti-base activism as single-issue activism of 
which the goal is the removal of bases. On the other hand, I use the terms anti-war and anti-
militarist activism to refer to a broader form of anti-base activism grounded in principled 
views both against militarism and war, and in defense of participatory democratic ideas. 
The movement’s targets have consistently been the US and Japanese governments, and to 
a lesser extent, the mainland Japanese public, as the primary focus of the peace movement 
has been the removal of the military bases in Okinawa. The movement’s strategies include 
mass protest, civil disobedience, the creation of NGOs and civic associations, and the 
active reframing of anti-militarist issues in terms of environmental protection. Activists 
have also self-consciously used delaying tactics to great effect, in particular with regard 
to the construction of one of the relocated bases. On the other hand, the Okinawan 
peace movement also exempliﬁes the relationship between the idea of “local” peace and 
“global” peace, showing that these are increasingly intertwined and mutually dependent. 
3 Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle, 4-5.
4 Hook and Siddle, eds., Japan and Okinawa, 16.
5 Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle, 10.
6 Barash and Webel, eds., Peace and Conﬂict Studies.
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Indeed the globalization of democratic values, coupled with human rights, has marked 
the advent of a new era of international cooperation structured around ethical norms. 
This in turn provides a novel normative framework for local peace movements and their 
efforts to constrain governmental policies. While the movement has consistently framed 
the request for the removal of the bases within a principled anti-war and anti-militarist 
discourse, it is increasingly arguing for the economic, political and social transformation 
of Okinawa. As the Okinawan movement internationalizes, its activists are now also 
aiming for a global audience. Though the movement’s goals in securing the removal 
of the bases may not have been achieved, nevertheless this multi-dimensional peace 
movement’s achievement has been signiﬁcant. In stressing in both action and principle 
the applicability of the global principles of participatory citizenship and human rights to 
the more general causes of demilitarization, peace, and social justice, the movement has 
successfully generated a sustainable platform for public contestation and the formulation 
of principled appeals for peace and democracy. In particular, it has effectively deployed 
radical participatory democratic action in the public scrutiny of the bases’ impact on 
Okinawa and of governmental action.
In the ﬁrst section of the paper, I present examples of the movement’s conscious use 
of participatory citizenship for the purpose of principled resistance on behalf of peace, 
and for the creation of symbolic spaces of public contestation, in the period from 1955 
and with special focus on the decade between 1995 and 2005. I consider the reasons for 
the success of the movement in terms of gathering mass support by the local population, 
and restraining the government’s plan to relocate a military base to a pristine offshore site. 
I show how the movement appeals to the democratization of Okinawa by emphasizing 
the radical democratic function of a critical civil society, on the basis of existing solidarist 
community beliefs. I also discuss how the movement succeeds in generating a collective 
narrative of resistance across historical time, and capitalizes on symbolic events to 
become a “signiﬁer” of Okinawan conscience. In the second section, I contextualize 
activists’ calls for peace through democratization within Japanese democracy itself, and 
its speciﬁcity as a “peace democracy.” I consider some of the policy responses of the 
Japanese government to the mass protests and civil disobedience campaigns of 1995-
2005. I conclude that though these did not lead to the removal of the bases or even to their 
signiﬁcant reduction, the Okinawan movement’s sustained scrutiny of the government 
has revealed both its inability to secure the rights of Okinawan people, and to exemplify 
a “peace democracy,” thus generating a coherent critique of the limitations of Japanese 
democracy and its current conceptions of security. I conclude by brieﬂy drawing some 
theoretical conclusions about the applicability of the Okinawan peace movement’s model, 
insofar as it combines principled participatory democracy with peace-oriented claims to 
generate a symbolic space of public conscience and contestation.
Identity, community, and civic activism in Okinawa
Okinawa’s geographical, social and cultural marginalization has consistently posed a 
problem for the Japanese government. The Okinawan peace movement has evolved as a 
series of “waves” of activism from immediate post-war occupation to the present, with 
an initial focus on the single issue of the removal of the bases, and gradually expanding 
to include the causes of human rights, social justice, and antimilitarism.7 This historical 
7 Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle, 8-9. Tanji bases her analysis on Okinawan activist and historian Arasaki 
Moriteru’s use of the concept of three “waves” of Okinawan struggle (Okinawa tōsō).
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progression of the movement’s activities has generated a solid foundation for the peace 
movement and given it its air of sustainability. The concern with the use of Okinawa, 
an island itself a victim of war, for the propagation of more war is seen as an intensely 
personal issue by Okinawans, who have insisted on a identity with their own history, 
culture, and language, different from that constructed hegemonically for Okinawa by the 
mainland Japanese.8 
Okinawa, a frontier territory made up of a series of islands spanning the seas 
between Japan and Taiwan, was formally the Ryūkyū Kingdom, with tributary diplomatic 
connections with China.9 Under increasing Japanese inﬂuence in the 17th and 18th centuries, 
Okinawa was ﬁnally formally annexed and assimilated into Japan as a prefecture in the 
early Meiji period in 1879. This constituted Okinawa’s ﬁrst experience of subordination. 
At the end of the Second World War, from March to June 1945, the Battle of Okinawa 
was a cataclysmic event, one of the most traumatic of the War, and further entrenched 
Okinawa’s subordinate position vis-à-vis mainland Japan. The subsequent twenty-seven 
year long military occupation by the US reinforced the daily confrontation with military 
realities, and established a pattern of dispossession and marginalization of the people of 
Okinawa. 
The double experience of marginalization and oppression by two national powers, 
namely Japan and the US, added a distinct sense of political marginalization to the existing 
feeling of victimization induced by war trauma and the subsequent militarization of the 
island. Anti-base claims have thus consistently been underpinned by demands for the 
public recognition of the distinctiveness of both Okinawa’s local identity, and of its war 
trauma during the Battle of Okinawa.10 Okinawa’s environment and development were also 
affected by the presence of the bases and by increasing economic dependence on Japan11 
(McCormack 2003). Thus since reversion to Japan in 1972, and despite widespread hope 
for the return of the military bases, these islands retain 75% of the total number of US 
military bases in less than 1% of the landmass of Japan. Concomitantly, as a prefecture 
of Japan, Okinawa paradoxically occupies a central role in the geopolitics of the region 
and arguably in global geopolitics.12 However, despite propaganda by mainland Japan 
about the return to the “motherland,” and the service done to Japan’s national security by 
Okinawa’s hosting of the bases, Okinawa’s reversion to Japan did not bring with it further 
recognition of the plight of Okinawans. Instead, an increasing feeling of betrayal by the 
mainland government prevailed.13 
The Okinawan peace movement’s inﬂuence is strong, and the movement relies 
on iconic events functioning as signposts in the construction of collective narratives of 
resistance. Activists in Okinawa come from a range of socio-economic backgrounds, 
and include local ﬁshermen, students, academics and intellectuals, architects, public 
administrators, and generally concerned citizens. The movement itself has not been 
consistently uniﬁed, but includes different groups of Okinawan citizens with overlapping 
8 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military, Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle, Hein and Selden, eds., Islands 
of Discontent, and Hook and Siddle, eds., Japan and Okinawa. 
9 See Kerr, Okinawa.
10 Yonetani, “Contested Memories”, 189.
11 McCormack, “Okinawa and the Structure of Dependence”.
12 Furuki, “Considering Okinawa as a Frontier”, and Gabe, “It is High Time to Wake Up”.
13 Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available, Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed, Yamamoto, Grassroots Paciﬁsm 
in Post-War Japan. 
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and complementary activities, including anti-base labor unions, landowners, women’s 
groups, and local civic groups. The movement as a whole is not hierarchic, though it 
relies on the transmission and knowledge base of elders, particularly with regard to the 
experience of the war. It is the movement’s ﬂuidity and ability to undergo constant renewal 
which allows it to enjoy wide popular support in Okinawa. Concomitantly, the use of civil 
disobedience and mass protest developed in a unique direction in Okinawa. Okinawan civil 
disobedience strategies have capitalized on solidarist community traditions of participation 
and engagement, and have used the language of democratization with reference to the 
thriving civic culture already existing in Okinawa. Thus crucially, the evolution of the 
movement has consistently asserted and modeled the practice of democratic rights. It is 
widely recognized that military bases are not compatible with local civic life. Yet the process 
of alienation of citizens from decision-making, as well as the impact of the militarization 
of Okinawa on its economy and its environment, has paradoxically generated a keener 
sense of civic life in Okinawa. In addition, the concern with the use of Okinawa, itself a 
victim of war, for the propagation of more war is seen as an intensely personal issue by 
Okinawan activists. At the same time as the discourses of state security, military alliance, 
and the balance of power have been imposed on them, Okinawans have been subjected 
to various forms of direct and structural violence. The discrepancy between the power of 
the US military occupation and the vulnerability of the local population has thus been a 
key element of the anti-base movement’s discursive framing as offering a principled, anti-
militarist critique of the existing hegemonic forces. 
The US army began their occupation by divesting the local population of their land 
for the purpose of the building of bases. The ﬁrst “wave” of Okinawan activism thus 
saw the emergence of a multiplicity of political parties, labor union movements, and 
movements of landowners and farmers to protest against US land acquisition.14  A brutal 
seizure of land in 1955, followed by the discovery of the rape and murder of a six-year-
old girl, were some of the ﬁrst dramatic events which galvanized indignation and were 
followed by mass protest.15 As early as 1956, as many as 160,000 to 200,000 out of a total 
of about 800,000 local residents joined rallies against US land acquisition policies and 
to demand the departure of the US military.16 Such early protest movements in Okinawa, 
such as the Ie-jima march of dispossessed farmers, though not explicitly predicated on 
paciﬁst principles, nevertheless communicated the need for principled action to confront 
the violence of militarism. As Miyume Tanji comments, the ﬁve-month nonviolent march 
in 1956, led by the farmers turned “beggars,” “exempliﬁes collective action at its most 
desperate and symbolically powerful.”17 The Ie-jima march constituted nothing other than 
principled action aimed at highlighting the reality of the dispossession and humiliation 
of an already war-traumatized local population. This served as a model for later action, 
including the “anti-war landowners” movement (or “one-tsubo movement”), when a 
certain number of landowners consistently refused to sign lease contracts with the US 
military on the principle of opposition to war and militarism.18  Though these “objectors” 
represented a minority among a majority of so-called “contract landowners” who entered 
14 Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle, 56-60.
15 Ibid., 158-159.
16 Ibid., 71.
17 Ibid., 69.
18 Ibid., 107.
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into lease contracts with the US, their action gained momentum in 1971 after the Anti-
War Landowners’ organization was formed.19 This movement has acquired iconic status as 
one of the main contributions of the Okinawan peace movement to principled resistance 
against militarism. Later, under Article V of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the 
Japanese government became the subcontractor for the Okinawan landowners’ leases to 
the US military, thus further entrenching Okinawa’s subsidy economy and dependence on 
Japan, as Okinawans became reliant on the Japanese government for income from rent. 
The movement’s idealist expectations were also in severe contrast with the realities 
of ensuing militarization of the island. The wish of Okinawans was for the number of 
military bases to be radically diminished, and that this should be accompanied by the 
recognition of landowners’ rights. However, militarization went ahead unimpeded, with 
a noxious increase in weaponry on the island, including B-52 bombers, and nuclear and 
chemical weapons. Moments of strategic involvement of the island’s bases in external wars 
typically highlighted the sacriﬁce of the Okinawan people and of their living environment 
for the purposes of the US-Japan security alliance. The daily ﬂying of B-52s from the US 
bases for the war in Vietnam added a global outreach to the presence of the bases and 
their direct implication in violence and war. It further angered Okinawans as they were 
reminded of their own experience of the Battle of Okinawa and felt complicity in the 
Vietnam War, leading to massive protests and strikes demanding the bases’ removal.20 
By 1995, 85,000 Okinawans out of a total population of 1.4 million used mass protest 
to express “their unwillingness to endure any more of the abuse, outrage, insecurity, 
nuisance, or inconvenience imposed by this foreign military presence.”21 
In addition, post-reversion Okinawa further experienced the imposition of the 
public works model of Japanese development, coupled with increasing tourism, which 
had a devastating impact on the Okinawan environment.22 As the Japanese government 
imposed its own version of development on Okinawa, it used extensive payouts to placate 
discontent with the bases, thus highlighting the links between Okinawa’s economic 
dependence on Japan and the militarization of the island. 
The third wave of Okinawan protest was thus initially framed by two iconic events 
which galvanized attention once again to the problem of insecurity generated by the 
presence of the bases. One was the rape in 1995 of a schoolgirl by American servicemen, 
and the other, in August 2004, was the crash of a US army helicopter on the campus of 
one of Okinawa’s universities. Masamichi Inoue has convincingly evoked the way in 
which this event came to signify the idea of a “raped Okinawa,” as the 12-year old girl 
and Okinawa itself came to be discursively represented as “itaikena (innocent), kayowai 
(helpless), and kiyorakana (pure).”23 The event also came to symbolically represent the 
endemic sexual violence against women accompanying the military presence in Okinawa, 
including the prevalence of rape and prostitution. Today, however, it is the global appeal 
for the protection of the unique biodiversity around the area of Henoko, and in particular 
the dugong, which has become the icon of an anti-base movement, standing for the defense 
19 Ibid., 108.
20 Ibid., 79. Later, the fact that the US bases on Okinawa were used to deploy troops during the Gulf War 
constituted another reason for increased concern about the ongoing militarization of the island.
21 Ibid., 1.
22 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military, and McCormack, “Okinawa and the Structure of Dependence”.
23 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military, 39.
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of the purity of Okinawa’s environment. 24  
The politicization of Okinawan identity is signiﬁcant in having provided a 
framework for community participation, in which powerful bonds of solidarity are forged. 
It is reasonable to hypothesize that such existential belonging contributes to explaining 
Okinawans’ concern for their environment, as well as activists’ readiness for immersion in 
purposeful protest. Okinawan indigenous spirituality underpins the powerful experience 
of local attachment which binds Okinawans and ultimately inspires their motivation for 
social activism. Indeed the direct expression of grievance in Okinawa is linked to an 
intense form of spirituality articulated around nature and the environment and transmitted 
through oral traditions.25 These bonds of solidarity in turn allow for the expression of 
common concerns and goals as communities of self-reﬂection and knowledge are 
progressively built. Local citizens, such as older people, have readily joined not only 
in peace marches but also in the creation of civic associations and in civil disobedience 
action. Several associations of concerned citizens upholding democratic associational 
rights, such as the “Society for the Protection of Life,” the “Society of Nago Citizens 
Opposed to the Heliport,” the “All-Nago Citizens’ group against the Heliport,” and the 
“Conference Opposing the Offshore Heliport and for the Peace and Democratization of 
Nago City” were formed.26 In particular, when the Society for the Protection of Life 
began a daily sit-in on the site of Henoko beach, near the proposed site of relocation of 
the Futenma base, in January 1997, Okinawa’s elders joined in, lending social legitimacy 
to their cause. This action by Okinawan citizens featured the involvement of Okinawan’s 
very elderly people, including a 93-year old woman who was reported by the Conference 
Opposing the Offshore Heliport as saying, “It was because of the blessings from this 
sea that we could raise our children. It is our duty to pass on to our children the treasure 
that is the sea.”27 The most dramatic period of the sit-in on the sea off Henoko began in 
2004 and was eventually made the object of a BBC documentary for “The Earth Report,” 
as activists encouraged the growing presence of the international media. The activists, 
joined by ﬁshermen, went as far as to swim out onto the sea in kayaks and climb onto the 
offshore construction towers to prevent surveyors sent by the Japanese government from 
carrying out drilling tests under the sea. As one account of the heroic sit-in explains, such 
action means that, “Ordinary life is sacriﬁced/The same process repeated over and over 
brings exhaustion/Physical and mental strength are stretched to the limit.”28 The daily, 
and eventually nightly sit-ins lasted until September 2005, when the Japanese authorities 
announced they would remove the offshore towers, thus sealing the activists’ success in 
delaying the beginning of the construction of the new offshore base.
The mythical Henoko sit-in illustrates the effectiveness of the movement’s combined 
24 One notable example is a current court action carried out in the United States to require the US government 
to consider the impact on the dugong of their intended construction of a new off-shore base at the pristine 
site of Henoko to relocate the base at Futenma which was located in the middle of a very densely populated 
part of Okinawa. See David Allen, “Suit Threatens Okinawa Air Station, Marines move to Guam,” Stars 
and Stripes, 21 September 2007, and John Roach, “Rare Japanese Dugong Threatened by US Military 
Base,” National Geographic News, 23 August 2007.
25 See Rokkum, Nature, Ritual and Society.
26 The 21 anti-base groups formed a coalition, the Nago Citizens Referendum Promotion Council. 
27 See the document “Henoko Action” issued by The Conference Opposing the Offshore Heliport and for 
the Peace and Democratization of Nago City.
28 Ibid.
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use of civil disobedience and community solidarity, while making use of the global 
normative language of democracy. The sit-in, which began in January 1997 and ended 
in 2004 with the effective postponement of the construction of a new offshore base to 
replace the airbase at Futenma, exempliﬁes Okinawan civil disobedience and its reliance 
on communal bonds of solidarity. The idea that citizens joined the movement without 
prior political afﬁliation became a positive attribute of the movement, both for progressive 
political parties and unions, and for the local people’s associations.29 These associational 
activities developed alongside a general appeal for citizens’ rights and for the Nago 
City Referendum, held on December 21, 1997, on the relocation of the Futenma base 
in Ginowan city to Henoko village. In this referendum, despite threats and manipulative 
tactics by the government such as increased offers of monetary compensation for the 
relocation of the base, Okinawan citizens forcefully expressed their opposition to the 
relocation and construction of the new offshore US base and heliport in Henoko. The 
action surrounding the Henoko issue brought together anti-militarist and democratic 
groups to pressurize the national government, and highlighted the activities of newly 
globalized women’s and environmental movements in Okinawa.30 The integration of a 
critical gendered perspective thus not only transformed the “Okinawa Struggle” from “a 
struggle to protect speciﬁc local interests into a struggle to protect human rights,”31 but 
further emphasized the principle of participatory democracy and the role of women in 
generating civic solidarity. In addition, environmental movements similarly drew attention 
to the universally relevant connection between military bases and the destruction of local 
environments, thus exemplifying the effective creation of alternative spaces for public 
knowledge by concerned citizens. 
Principled action both on behalf of peace and on behalf of democracy, speciﬁcally 
redirecting attention away from notions of nationalism and national defense, had merged 
from the very beginnings of the movement in Okinawa. As Hook and Siddle suggest in 
their response to the hypothetical question of Okinawa’s transcending of the category of 
the nation-state, “it is the ‘guardians of Okinawa’s conscience,’ the anti-war landlords with 
their attachment to the 1947 constitution, who are bound most closely to conventional 
notions of citizenship”32 in Okinawa. Indeed, it may be said that many such actors in 
Okinawa have exercised their citizenship rights with the view to being the “guardians 
of the Japanese conscience.” All in all, the movement for the Referendum against the 
relocation of the base to Henoko achieved two things. First, it “brought the history of 
Okinawa’s social movements to a new height by forming … a broader public sphere 
of discussion about the US military”33 within Japan. Second, it transformed Okinawa’s 
political and social self-representation from that of “a poor, oppressed ‘people’” to “that 
of conﬁdent, afﬂuent ‘citizens’ of diverse backgrounds awakened to globally disseminated 
ideas about ecology, women’s issues, and peace.”34 Simultaneously, it helped further deﬁne 
29 As Tanji writes, these civic associations “deﬁned themselves as a “citizens” movement body” (shimin 
undotai) of free-willed individuals,” emphasizing “the importance of solidarity among parties and unions,” 
where shimin “signiﬁes ordinariness, non-afﬁliation to any political organization, and a non-ideological 
position.” Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle, 167.
30 Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle, 169.
31 Ibid., 183.
32 Hook and Siddle, Japan and Okinawa, 249.
33 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military, 157.
34 Ibid.
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the role of democratic citizenship for Okinawans, as a critical signiﬁer of the ability of 
people to challenge the Japanese government and other powers-that-be. As Masamichi 
Inoue comments, “shimin [citizen/resident] became a metaphor for hybrid citizenship 
that was simultaneously grounded in locality, entangled in nationality, and involved in 
globality.”35 
The contribution of the Okinawan peace movement to Japanese democracy
The Okinawan peace movement has brought to public scrutiny the question of the role 
of civil society for participatory decision-making as an ethical issue within Japanese 
democracy itself. It has modeled the vital role of the local, grassroots dimensions of 
democracy in delegitimizing certain policies, within a national democracy where 
contestation is seldom heard or practiced. Okinawan activists’ effectiveness in their use of 
strategies of participatory democracy between 1995 and 2005 can be attested by the Japanese 
government’s response to the relentless pressure leveled at it regarding the presence of 
the bases. A series of attempts at establishing high proﬁle consultative and representative 
processes between 1995 and 2000 indicated the pressure felt by the Japanese government 
faced with a protest movement that, signiﬁcantly, became a signiﬁer of the ineffectiveness 
and the undemocratic nature of centralized policy-making in Japan. On the one hand, 
sustained action on the part of activists, combined with the popular support this action 
has enjoyed, has highlighted the limitations of the Japanese government in encouraging 
the recognition of Okinawan people’s views on the bases. Simultaneously, attention has 
been drawn to the structural impediments posed to the growth of local autonomy by 
a centralized Japanese bureaucracy, and to the need to restructure national–prefectural 
and especially national–municipal relationships.36 The Special Action Committee for 
Okinawa – SACO – was established precisely as an international policy forum led by the 
Japanese and US governments as a response to the protest movement of 1995. As its cited 
objective was to include local people’s voices, a consultative body was created to improve 
the capacity of the prefecture to represent local interests in communication with both the 
Japanese and the US governments.37 In addition, a new type of governmental intervention 
was established, designed to respond to the economic and social needs of the municipal 
governments hosting the bases and “improve national–local relationships.”38 As Keisuke 
Enokido argues, these policy interventions demonstrated the fact that the “rise of local 
civil society in Okinawa manifested in the 1995 protest rally was a challenge to the role 
and capacity of the national Japanese government,” as the Japanese “state’s power to 
deal with regional and/or local problems was deeply questioned.”39 Indeed SACO and 
its associated bodies rapidly became the emblem of the Japanese betrayal of Okinawa, 
especially when it was discovered that as a result of the process, the Futenma base would 
be relocated to an offshore site in Henoko rather than returned. 
Another example of Japan’s efforts to contain Okinawan opposition was the 
“Okinawa Initiative,” which in 2000 attempted to address some of the grievances aired 
35 Ibid., 168.
36 Enokido, “Okinawa After the Cold War”, 86.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 87. This was known as the “Round Table on the Municipalities of Okinawa accommodating US 
military bases”.
39 Ibid. 100.
－10－
earlier by the people of Okinawa during the mass protests about the September 1995 
rape.40 Again, this policy backﬁred against the government and served to intensify public 
debate in Okinawa and the voices of the peace movement. This initiative, involving 
the conservative prefectural government of Governor Inamine, aimed at some form of 
recognition of the unjust burden placed on Okinawan citizens and of their sacriﬁces for 
the sake of national security and the Japan–US security alliance. However, the outcome of 
the Initiative was ultimately to undermine Okinawans’ claims for the public recognition 
of the abuse and marginalization they suffered due to the bases. Instead, the Initiative 
attempted to redeﬁne the social and economic purpose of the bases and their role in the 
maintenance of national security.41 Such a stance underscored the ideological collusion 
between concepts of national security and the government’s inability to deal with claims 
of difference, human rights, and recognition through appropriate democratic principles of 
governance. 
The SACO and Okinawa Initiative debacles encapsulate the dynamics between 
the powers dominating policy making in Okinawa, including the US and Japan, and the 
antimilitarist movement which continues to maintain a posture of principled resistance, 
within the Japanese and even the global public sphere, with regard to the militarization 
of Okinawa. As Hideki Yoshikawa argues, with reference to the connection within the 
Okinawan anti-base movement between Okinawan political self-determination and 
environmental politics, “The dynamic interplay between Okinawans and the international 
community helps sustain and is sustained by the continued strong voice of the majority of 
the Okinawans who oppose the construction.”42 This dynamic can also be explained with 
reference to another factor unique to the Japanese context which has allowed the Okinawan 
peace movement to exercise the important function of “delegitimizing preparations for war 
and legitimizing norms,” through the exercise of ideational power and principled action 
with global reach. This is the original connection between democracy, demilitarization, 
and peace in post-war Japan. As Mari Yamamoto argues, the link in Japan’s modern 
collective political imagination between democratization and a national identity based on 
the principles of peace necessarily has implications for civic engagement within Japanese 
democracy.43 The speciﬁcity of the Japanese peace movement, compared to Western 
peace movements based on religious and liberal traditions, is its secular interpretation 
of principled democracy, and its association of peace with what essentially amounts to 
human security principles. Indeed the Japanese people’s main concern was with “better 
economic wellbeing and advancement of their human rights.”44 Signiﬁcantly, for Glenn 
Hook, remilitarization came “to take priority over a number of constitutional and other 
principles meant to impede militarization,” such as the important Article 9 of the so-
called Japanese “Peace Constitution,” which proclaims Japan’s renunciation of war as a 
sovereign right.45 
This has enabled the cognitive reframing of the Okinawan peace movement, 
within the triangular relationship between Japan, the US, and Okinawa, and governed 
by the discourse of state security, into a critical discourse defending progressive social 
40 Yonetani, “Future “Assets”, but at What Price?: The Okinawa Initiative Debate”.  
41 Ibid.
42 Yoshikawa, “Internationalizing the Okinawan Struggle”, 12. 
43 Yamamoto, Grassroots Paciﬁsm.
44 Ibid., 10.
45 Hook, “The Erosion of Anti-Militaristic Principles”, 381.
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values against the forces of hegemony. Okinawan’s anti-militarist radicalism and focus 
on issues of social justice and well-being – in short, their redeﬁnition of the meaning 
of security and their focus on human security – must be understood in the context of 
Japan’s history of militarization, de-militarization, and re-militarization.46 The disconnect 
between factual remilitarization and the constitutional discourse of peace has accentuated 
the importance of antimilitarist principles precisely as they were being threatened. This 
in turn has provided an appropriate framework within which Japanese peace movements 
could forge their normative and ethical legitimacy. Okinawa’s unique geopolitical 
position as a frontier region in the Paciﬁc has thus paradoxically led to the opportunity 
for Okinawans to construct a new form of political identity and discursive positioning as 
monitors of democratic, human rights, and human security principles in the region. As 
Masaaki Gabe suggests, the triangular relationship between Japan, the US, and Okinawa 
has been the deﬁning feature of the political struggle which forms the basis of Okinawan 
peace activism.47 The defeat of the nation-wide protest movement against the revision 
of the US-Japan Security Treaty (ampo) sealed Okinawa’s unique geopolitical position 
within East Asia as the cornerstone of the US-Japan security alliance, but it also placed 
the spotlight on the treaty and its consequences. Masamichi Inoue goes as far as arguing 
that this triangle can be seen as a structural part of the “intimate society,” “constructed at 
once economically, militarily, and ideologically, across the broader Asia-Paciﬁc region.”48 
under the distorted principle of “mutual beneﬁt” relationships. As Toshiaki Furuki argues, 
Okinawa has become the seed for a new “ﬂuctuation”49 within the internationalized 
security structure. What essentially constituted an oppressive, neo-imperial policy for a 
minority population of a frontier territory also presented an opportunity to highlight the 
impact of traditional security policy and decision-making by alliances of powerful nation-
states on the fabric of democracy itself. As the Okinawan anti-base movement participants 
surmised, the high level of legitimacy enjoyed by this security discourse eventually made 
it the ideal object of principled opposition, framed by the norms of democracy, human 
rights, and peace.
The instrumental nature of Okinawan identity in the anti-base struggle has been 
extensively documented.50 I would argue that the contribution of the politicization of 
Okinawan identity lies precisely in showing how a local identity based on universal aspects 
of experience such as violent oppression and marginalization, can intersect with a global 
identity based on the common goals of humanity, peace and human security. Reframing 
the question of the bases in Okinawa as an issue of social injustice and (in)security for 
local Okinawans, within the national democratic context of a constitutional “peace” 
democracy, has paved the way for the movement’s critique of the role of militarism in 
democracy on the basis of solidarist and community values, which paradoxically lead 
to a universal stance on global human rights and democratic values. Indeed the original 
link made by the US occupation between democratization and demilitarization made the 
subsequent alliance between the US and Japan particularly vulnerable to criticism on 
46 Hook, “The Erosion of Anti-Militaristic Principles”, 381. See also Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization 
in Contemporary Japan, and Hook and McCormack, Japan’s Contested Constitution.
47 Gabe, “It is High Time to Wake Up”, 59.
48 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military, 134.
49 Furuki, “Considering Okinawa as a Frontier”, 36.
50 See for example Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military, Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle, Hein and 
Selden, Islands of Discontent, Siddle, “Return to Uchina”, and Molasky, “Arakawa Akira”. 
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the basis of shared historical memory. As Nikki Kersten highlights in her analysis of 
Japanese paciﬁsm, disenchantment with “Occupation democracy” did not detract from 
the development of an “indigenous democratic philosophy” ﬁrmly connected with peace 
principles.51 While Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution inextricably joined peace 
principles with democracy, this innovative normative design was to be put to the test 
during the unprecedented display of political activism around the revision of the US-
Japan Mutual Security Treaty in 1960. 
In effect, the various intellectual movements participating in the debate came to 
critique particularist notions of democracy as exempliﬁed by the push for the replication 
of the American model, and to internationalize or universalize a unique, or indeed 
indigenous Japanese vision of a democratic peace rooted in Japan’s unique experience 
of suffering under the atomic bomb in particular, and the consequent binding of the 
Japanese people into what the French would call lien social. Thus for Shin Chiba, “Japan’s 
constitutional paciﬁsm has implied a tacit social contract among the people themselves, 
as well as between the people and the government.”52 Paradoxically, the normative power 
of concepts hybridizing peace and democracy such as kyosei, or conviviality, would lie 
in their being ﬁrmly anchored within “indigenous” democratic and peace cultures.53 As 
Tanji explains with regard to the original anti-base actors in Okinawa such as the anti-war 
landowners, their contribution was to demonstrate “their deﬁnition of ‘Okinawanness’ in 
terms of adherence to the image of an ideal, democratic and constitutional nation-state, 
conceived during the reversion movement.”54 
In addition, the Okinawan peace movement advocates a radical approach to citizenship, 
not only in modeling principled civic action, but also in fundamentally rethinking the 
role of identity within a globally conceived, cosmopolitan democracy. Indeed peace and 
democratic activists in Okinawa have emphasized the links between democratization and 
minority rights in Japan. Indigenous communal identity has been mobilized in Okinawa 
as a collective resource of shared experience from which to shape principled action on 
behalf of peace. A small group of Okinawans has taken the struggle for the recognition of 
Okinawa’s unique indigenous identity to human rights bodies within the United Nations, 
offering, as Siddle writes, “a fascinating insight into the constructed nature of some ethnic 
categories, and the intricate and dialectical relationship between notions of identity and 
political strategies.”55 This movement is forging links with the Ainus’ claims for self-
determination on the basis of a shared experience of internal colonialism, oppression, and 
marginalization by the Japanese state.56 In this perspective, “ethnicity is not something 
people ‘have’, but something that they ‘do’,” in that “they learn, articulate, negotiate 
and reinforce their cultural identities through participation in complex webs of social 
interaction.”57 The political strategy of the radical rejection of Japanese identity in favor of 
such a locally conceived identity is here accompanied by the appropriation of international 
norms. First, the connection with other indigenous movements legitimizes the expression 
of oppression at the level of international ethics, while associating peace with pluralism, 
51 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 171.
52 Chiba, “Reﬂection on the Paciﬁst Principle”, 231.
53 Ibid., 238.
54 Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle, 173.
55 Siddle, “Return to Uchina”, 134.
56 Ibid., 138.
57 Ibid., 133.
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minority rights, and basic democratic governance. Second, as the issue of recognition 
is raised in the context of the ongoing oppression of Okinawa, it directly challenges 
Japan’s designs for cultural homogeneity. This further contributes to deconstructing the 
necessary connection between national identity and citizenship. As Takashi Kibe argues 
with regard to Japan, claims for the recognition of difference by various minority groups 
have encouraged the critique of a “model of ethnocultural uniformity that is presupposed 
by the conventional concept of citizenship.”58 In so doing, activists have shown that local 
identity overlaps with a universal identity based on a global framework of norms, and that 
the quest for universal principles evolves from an active public sphere where the voices 
for peace are heard from the grassroots. 
The politicization of Okinawan identity is also signiﬁcant because it provides a 
framework for community participation, in which powerful social bonds are forged and 
the voices of the people and the voices of peace converge. These bonds of solidarity in 
turn allow for the expression of common concerns and goals as communities of self-
reﬂection and knowledge are progressively built. Tanji notes the role played by the 
diversity of voices and actors in the movement, but also identiﬁes the coherence of the 
movement in a powerful bonding, not only through shared communal identity, but also 
through historical memory. Compounded with the experience of direct battle, the added 
trauma of the Japanese Imperial Army’s pressure on Okinawans to commit collective 
suicide added to the forging of communal traumatic memory. I would argue further 
that Tanji’s reference to an “absolute paciﬁsm”59 evokes a community of knowledge 
built around the memory of war. A series of memorials and museums commemorating 
the Battle of Okinawa erected by the prefectural government and the object of peace 
education tours for schoolchildren, have contributed to the elaboration of an ofﬁcial anti-
war discourse at the prefectural level in Okinawa. Signiﬁcantly, these have also been the 
site of further contestation as the restitution of collective memory has been critiqued for 
not sufﬁciently reﬂecting grassroots experiences of the war. Julia Yonetani explores in 
detail the “contested narratives” of the war experience around the establishment of various 
museums to commemorate the Battle of Okinawa.60 As the alteration of the “truth” of the 
Battle of Okinawa as experienced by Okinawans became the subject of controversy, the 
Okinawan peace movement produced another critique of nationalism and the enduring 
lack of acknowledgement of war responsibility by the Japanese government.61 In another 
effective display of grassroots democracy claiming the right to information, a group of 
citizens and the Okinawa Historical Film Society, the “one foot” movement, successfully 
reclaimed footage of ﬁlm from the US National Archive in Washington, DC.62 Similarly, 
the question of the role of witnessing and “speaking truth to power” was publicly debated 
by Okinawan civil society in the 1980s as the national government “screened” Japanese 
school history textbooks, especially with regard to the role of the Japanese military during 
58 Kibe, “Differentiated Citizenship”, 420.
59 Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle, 41.
60 Yonetani, “Contested Memories”. In this paper, Yonetani presents a detailed account of how the prefectural 
government became the object of vigorous critique as decision-making regarding the representation of the 
collective suicides in the exhibits became increasingly shrouded in secrecy.
61 Ibid., 200.
62 Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle, 45. One of the movement’s commitment was to break the silence 
surrounding Okinawan’s war survivors, and promote a form of oral history and retelling of survivors’ 
experiences.
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the Battle of Okinawa. The debate around revisionism in relation to the mass suicides of 
1945 as reported in school textbooks has had substantial ramiﬁcations in mainland Japan, 
ultimately contributing to the strengthening of a public sphere of criticism of Japanese 
nationalism.63
Finally, the Okinawan peace movement’s adoption of strategies of contention 
belonging to the more radical tradition of participatory democracy, as well as its 
reliance on patterns of community solidarity, distinguishes it from the liberal discourse 
which prioritizes tolerance, individualism and the protection of the private sphere, as 
emphasized by the Japanese government. Different historical contexts allow for peace 
movements to articulate the priority of values and norms that have particular resonance 
for a population. The history of the post-war democratization of Japan from the beginning 
of US occupation has been extensively documented.64 In particular, the constrained 
development of an autonomous civil society within a system of government resting on 
centralization and bureaucratization has received considerable attention.65 The origins of 
this approach to government in Japan may be traced back to longstanding traditions of 
political and administrative culture, which culminated in the centralized Meiji era.66 Thus 
the relatively slow evolution of a functioning and vital civil society in Japan, despite the 
undeniable growth of labor unions and the existence of a deﬁnite challenge from the left 
of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, has attracted considerable attention.67 While basic 
rights were guaranteed by the Constitution, the post-war focus on economic development 
and rapid modernization brought with it a signiﬁcant increase in the Japanese people’s 
enjoyment of a newly conceived private sphere. However it is generally acknowledged 
that while the Japanese government has encouraged the development of a private 
sphere through the emphasis on economic development and afﬂuence, local traditions 
of democratic participation, particularly in their more critical and contestatory forms, 
remain underdeveloped.68 Duncan McCargo is perhaps closer to the mark when he draws 
attention to the participatory approach to democracy which complements the liberal 
focus on the growth of the private sphere, with its concomitant ideologies emphasizing 
individualism and the market economy. He emphasizes the role of citizens’ movements, 
however marginal, for the development of a public space based on the tradition and 
63 The involvement of Nobel prize winner in literature Oe Kenzaburo in legal proceedings, as his anti-
governmental stance and “truth telling” regarding the suicides in one of his novels on Okinawa was 
attacked by an ex-commander of the Imperial Army, and his recent statement, on 10 November 2007, 
have contributed to the high proﬁling of the debate around Okinawa’s mass suicides. (Le Monde 30-
31/12/2007: 6)
64 Kersten and Williams, The Left in the Shaping of Japanese Democracy; Moore and Robinson, Partners 
for Democracy; Richardson, Japanese Democracy; Kersten. Democracy in Postwar Japan.
65 Kingston, Japan’s Quiet Transformation, Hirata, Civil Society in Japan, Tadashi, ed., Deciding the Public 
Good, and Iokibe, “Japan’s Civil Society: An Historical Overview”. See also Hasegawa, Constructing 
Civil Society in Japan, for a look at the growth of environmental movements.
66 Iokibe, “Japan’s Civil Society”, 63.
67 Jeff Kingston, applying a liberal framework to the assessment of recent developments within Japanese 
democracy, particularly in the area of the rule of law, sees in the growth of NPOs and various debates around 
judicial reforms a promising development for the challenge to centralized politics and the empowerment 
of a weakened Japanese citizenry. As he suggests, the most likely outcome of Japan’s process of legal 
reforms is likely to be the forging of a “deeper, broader, and stronger civil society”, though he does not 
elaborate on what forms such a civil society might take. Kingston, Japan’s Quiet Transformation, 91. 
68 See McCormack, The Emptiness of Japanese Afﬂuence.
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principles of grassroots egalitarian democracy, and its role in holding governments 
accountable. For example, referring to the peace and labor movements in Japan in the 
1960s and 1970s, McCargo ﬁnds that, while “these ad hoc movements do not appear to 
have been consolidated into lasting vehicles for political participation,” “there is no doubt 
that the citizens’ movements were effective in forcing the Japanese government to act.”69 
As McCargo also argues however, while Japan is “rich in associational life, possessing a 
great abundance of social capital in the form of neighborhood associations and collective 
activities,” the important question still remains whether this “rich community organization 
can also give rise to independent political life.”70 Indeed McCargo concludes that it is 
difﬁcult to establish whether the existence of certain pockets of civic activism in Japan 
merely reveals the impotence of the Japanese citizenry and the lack of participatory 
democracy in Japan. In this view, the weakness of Japanese democracy is highlighted by 
the strength of a core group of leaders, and activists.71 
As has been demonstrated so far, the hypothesis of the growth of civil society is not 
a framework of analysis that does justice to Okinawa’s successful challenge to, as well 
as contribution to, Japanese democracy. Nor does it explain the successful connection 
within Okinawan peace activism between the quest for social justice and the contestation 
of hegemonic forms of political expression, such as those necessarily associated with 
the nation state, nationalism, and security. A key indicator of the ability of citizens and 
grassroots movements to challenge state hegemony in areas of policy making clearly also 
lies in whether a conception of civil society exists, or may be forged, which allows for 
critical and contentious voices to be heard. As I have argued elsewhere,72 the other pillar 
of a healthy democracy is an active public sphere, however marginal, which relies on the 
more active and critical engagement with power. French republicanism is an expression 
of a democratic culture which developed historically over a signiﬁcant period of time, 
revealing the intimate connections between active citizenship, social critique, and the 
deepening of democracy as a means of social transformation. Participatory democracy, 
while prioritizing solidarist values such as community, social cohesion, and critique, 
forms an equally important basis for effective and critical communication in the public 
sphere, or “speaking truth to power.” This conception of democracy reveals the intimate 
connections between active citizenship, social critique, and the deepening of democracy 
as a means of social transformation, and centers on the role of the public sphere. The 
purpose of such a public space is the expression of a multiplicity of voices, including 
those of the most disempowered, and the ability to hold governmental policies to public 
scrutiny. In addition, movements of contention, civil disobedience, and spirited resistance 
are an important part of an “indigenous” democratic culture in France.73 Thus a similar 
form of participatory democracy as that found in Okinawa can be brieﬂy illustrated by the 
example of José Bové’s Confédération Paysanne in France. Originally a paciﬁst militant 
who used civil disobedience to protest against the expansion of a military camp on the 
Larzac plateau, Bové has since devoted his energies to humanist environmental activism, 
and regularly has recourse to civil disobedience, in particular in his action against GMOs, 
69 McCargo, Contemporary Japan, 173.
70 McCargo, Contemporary Japan, 169-170.
71 Ibid., 176-177.
72 Souillac, Human Rights in Crisis.
73 This type of participatory democracy is called contestation, and is often inspired by key philosophical 
texts and debates. See Crettiez and Sommier, La France Rebelle.
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while anchoring his local voice in the global discourse of environmentalism.74 For this 
type of movement, size or even popular support is not as important as radical visibility 
since such movements present themselves as the bearers of public conscience. In a totally 
different context, it can be said that the Okinawan peace movement has similarly relied on 
a more philosophical social and political critique for the framing of their more concrete 
claims for the reduction of the bases on the island. The establishment of the connection 
between Okinawans’ local needs, with the universal discourse of human security as well 
as participatory, or “people’s” democracy, is unique to the Okinawan movement as an 
example of indigenous manifestations of Japanese democracy.
Ultimately, the Okinawan peace movement’s main characteristics, namely its 
diversity, complexity, and sustainability, challenge the view of peace movements as 
structurally marginalized and unsustainable. As peace researchers have commented, 
peace movements have typically been reactive and periodic, growing when the threat to 
peace is great and then receding, leading either to the accusation of “ﬁckleness,”75 or to 
“activism fatigue.” 76 In addition, as is often argued, the pluralism of peace movements is 
not an encouraging sign in terms of the sustainability of modern peace activism.77 Thus as 
Barash and Webel argue, since “the overriding goal of many peace movement activists is 
not so much the elimination of states as their transformation,”78 peace movements should 
ideally communicate a coherent counter-discourse from which to confront hegemonic 
discourses of state security.79 In other words, there is an urgent need for peace movements 
not to remain limited by conceptions of their own structural and normative marginality. 
Yet, our understanding of the deeper structural conditions for peace movements’ creation 
of alternative social and political discourse remains limited. The idea of “enlightened 
participation” has been alluded to but not analyzed in depth.80 I would argue it better 
encapsulates the Okinawan peace movement’s distinct contribution to the modeling of 
peace movements. Enlightened participation indeed neatly conveys the interdependence 
between peace activism and principled activism on behalf of democratic norms as the 
best framework for the achievement of social justice. In addition, it communicates the 
idea that when community-based participatory democracy and peace combine in the 
creation of new public spaces and alternative communities of knowledge, this increases 
the normative power of peace movements. As Cecelia Lynch suggests, social movements 
“contest, legitimize, and delegitimize norms of behavior,” particularly by “delegitimizing 
preparations for war and legitimizing norms.”81 The Okinawan peace movement’s distinct 
contribution lies in its creation of such an enlightened and sustained space of democratic 
contestation on behalf of peace. The purpose of this space is independent from the more 
concrete goals of the return of the bases or the improvement of living conditions for 
Okinawans. Within such a space of public conscience, in which norms are upheld and 
supplemented by principled action, more intangible outcomes are also generated. These 
include the public identiﬁcation of the broad political and social issues of which the 
74 Ibid., 20.
75 Barash and Webel, Peace and Conﬂict Studies, 46.
76 Ibid., 52.
77 Ibid., 41.
78 Ibid., 43.
79 Ibid., 52.
80 Alger, “The expanding Tool Chest for Peacebuilders”, 42.
81 Lynch, Beyond Appeasement, 19.
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problems in Okinawa are but a symptom, the public critique and scrutiny of governmental 
security policies, and, ultimately, the building of communities of knowledge which offer 
alternative understandings of militarism and security, citizenship and nationalism. 
Conclusion
The Okinawan peace movement undeniably has a universal resonance, notably in its 
appeal to peace oriented values such as social solidarity, the environment, human rights, 
and social justice. I have argued in this paper that it has succeeded in creating a public 
space of contestation and public conscience which has put considerable pressure on, and 
even delegitimized, Japan’s security policies. The use of nonviolence, passive resistance 
and civil disobedience has allowed Okinawan activists to fully inhabit their role as truth-
tellers and to appeal to community solidarity on behalf of local participatory principles. 
It has also allowed them to communicate to an increasingly wider audience, from the 
local people of Okinawa, to Japanese people, and even to a global audience of concerned 
citizens equally concerned with the impact of war and militarism on local communities and 
human security. As such, the Okinawan peace movement may serve as a model for other 
movements, especially those which are anchored in traditions of community solidarity or 
share similar bonds of historical memory. In the end, the Okinawan movement shows that 
peace activism is integral to the universal shift towards deeper democratization, and vice 
versa. Its effectiveness in highlighting the connections between peace and democratic 
solidarity attests to the importance of democratic renewal as a vital component of peace.
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